Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Case Against Separating the Conjoined Twins by Kebadu Mekonnen Gebremariam
 
 
Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities (EJOSSAH): V. 16, No. 1 
This work is licensed to the publisher under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs License.  
ISSN (online): 2520-582X                                                                                                  ISSN (print): 1810-4487 
 
Human Rights and Human Dignity: A Case Against 
Separating the Conjoined Twins 
 
Kebadu Mekonnen Gebremariam 
Abstract  
Doris Schroeder asserts that the received view according to which human rights are 
derived from the inherent dignity of the human person must be rejected. She 
appeals to separate these conjoined twins (human dignity and human rights) by 
offering three knockdown arguments respectively captioned as ―the justification 
paradox‖, ―Kantian cul-de-sac‖ and ―hazard by association‖. This paper submits a 
case for preserving the conjoined twins, both by refuting Schroeder‘s arguments 
and at the same time proposing a positive appraisal of human dignity as 
foundational to human rights. The distributive account of a foundation, on which 
Schroeder‘s arguments are premised, requires that a normative foundation must 
underpin every single human rights claim. Human rights claims, as diverse as they 
are, admit plurality of normative foundations (understood in the distributive sense) 
and human dignity directly underpins only a subset of the most basic human rights. 
There is another sense in which human dignity can be conceived as foundational to 
human rights, precisely as the general moral standing of human beings as holders 
of the bundle of moral human rights. Foundation as moral standing is consistent 
with the view that not every human rights-claim has its normative foundation in 
human dignity; thus, Schroeder is mistaken in thinking that failing to be a 
foundation in the distributive sense defeats the accepted view that human rights 
derive from human dignity. 
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Human dignity‘s renewed currency in the philosophical discourse is often 
punctuated by sharp and often irreconcilable disagreements. The discourse is 
characterised by a clash between two opposing views, between radical scepticism 
to human dignity‘s normative significance to human rights and the dogmatic view 
which asserts that ―rights humans have as humans are based on dignity‖ (Schaber 
2013). Proponents of the latter view maintain that a compelling case can be made 
for the received view that the concept of human dignity is indispensable to the 
constitution of fundamental human rights (Waldron, 2009, 2012, 2013; Gewirth, 
1992 & Tasioulas, 2012, 2013). They submit that human rights are grounded on 
the moral framework within which the concept of human dignity is to be found. As 
humans, we have dignity and thus possess certain fundamental rights. 
This paper pivots on one situated debate within the general discourse 
concerning the foundation of human rights between a radical critic and a fervent 
proponent of a dignitarian foundation of human rights–namely Doris Schroeder 
and Peter Schaber respectively. Schroeder argues that an attempt to ground human 
rights in human dignity is bound to fail. Central to Schroeder‘s argument is the 
presumption that the contemporary notion of human dignity is borrowed from the 
religious idea of Imago Dei; whereas, the most promising secular variant–the 
Kantian conception, with its attendant focus on rational agency as the principal 
locus of our dignity, deviates from the egalitarian idea that human rights are 
inherently possessed by all human beings in virtue of their humanity. Such 
incongruity leads to a theoretical conundrum, according to Schroeder: one must 
either adopt a religious conception of human dignity whose relevance to a secular 
philosophy of human rights runs suspect or relinquish the idea of universal human 
rights in favour of a Kantian conception which is ostensibly restricted to the subset 
of humanity that is capable of rational agency. In response, Schaber laid down a 
two-tiered defence of the fundamental significance of human dignity to the human 
rights discourse. On the one hand, he examines and attempts to refute Schroeder‘s 
‗three knockdown arguments‘ by undermining both the validity of her reasoning as 
well as the truth value of the premises on which each of her three knockdown 
arguments are based. And on the other hand, he argues that none of the reasons 
Schroeder put forth, even if accepted as true, are sufficient to warrant her central 
thesis according to which the discourse on human rights must abandon making any 
recourse to the concept of human dignity. 
Although, admittedly, the claims defended here draw heavily on Schaber‘s 
pointed response and to that extent can be regarded as a rejoinder to his critique of 
Schroeder, this paper submits original and standalone reasons why Schroeder‘s 
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reasoning is flawed. The arguments to be advanced link brilliantly to a conceptual 
framework that not only survives Schroeder‘s objection but at the same time helps 
fill perceptible gaps in Schaber‘s reasoning. What is more, this paper asserts that 
the notion of human dignity is inseparably tied to the intuition about human beings 
as holders of some basic bundle of human rights. This is not to say that, for an 
effort at refuting Schroeder‘s objections to succeed it is necessary to confer a 
positive proposal towards a plausible concept of human dignity. It suffices to 
simply undermine Schroeder‘s arguments against the thesis that human dignity 
underpins human right–claims. However, this paper also makes a case against 
separating the conjoined twins, and to that extent it must make a positive proposal 
as to how the relation between human dignity and human rights ought to be 
conceived. That evidently requires more than pinpointing perceptible flaws in 
Schroeder‘s reasoning and towards a positive theory of the nature, value, and 
normative force of human dignity. To that end, Schaber propounds an adequacy 
condition for a plausible theory of human dignity, precisely that the proposed 
theory must ―account for the paradigmatic forms of the violation of human 
dignity‖ (Schaber, 2013, p. 159). However, he too seemed to have it backwards for 
the reason that before identifying some forms of treatment as paradigmatic 
violations of human dignity one must first be in possession of a substantive 
conception of human dignity on account of which such judgements are made. 
The following section unpacks Schroeder‘s three knockdown arguments and 
attempts to lay bare their fundamental flaws.  
 
Three flawed reasons for rejecting human dignity as a basis for human 
rights 
Schroeder puts forth three arguments in defence of her claim that we should 
abandon pursuing a dignitarian foundation of human rights, which she respectively 
labelled as ―the justification paradox‖, ―the Kantian cul-de-sac‖ and ―hazard by 
association.‖ There is no need to restate Peter Schaber‘s pointed remarks on each 
of her three arguments. I shall, however, put forth new insights into an approach at 
rescuing human dignity from radical sceptics such as Schroeder. 
Human dignity admits plurality of meanings, and there cannot be one 
canonical interpretation of the term fit for all discursive contexts. Schroeder holds 
that all the morally relevant meanings to the term can be classified under two 
contrasting categories: inviolable dignity and aspirational dignity. Inviolable 
dignity comprises of specific conceptions that are based on the intuitive idea that 
human dignity is an inalienable normative property have by all human beings. 
Specific conceptions under this category principally include ―traditional Catholic 
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dignity‖ and Kantian dignity. Aspirational dignity, on the other hand, reflects 
distinctions in status owing to one‘s accidental place in birth, or individual 
characteristic traits such as moral and intellectual virtues and comportment. It 
consists in ―aristocratic dignity,‖ ―comportment dignity,‖ and ―meritorious 
dignity‖. Aristocratic dignity is closely tied to the notion of (superior) social rank 
whether ascribed on the basis of purportedly inherent attributes acquired at birth or 
on the basis of merits accomplished by one‘s own effort. In this respect, rank 
reflects some salient features of the Roman dignitas. On the other hand, 
comportment and meritorious dignity function within the realms of virtue ethics- 
constituted by, in the case of the first, ―the outwardly displayed quality of a human 
being who acts in accordance with society‘s [rather contingent] expectations of 
well-mannered demeanour and bearing‖, and by observance to objective standards 
of virtue ―which subsumes the four cardinal virtues and one‘s sense of self-worth‖, 
in the case of the latter (Schroeder, 2012, p. 332). 
In her view, the controversy surrounding the concept of human dignity is 
reducible to the recognizable, albeit inherent, tension between these two categories 
of dignity. The dispute whether human rights are derived from human dignity will 
be pointless so long as this contradiction stays unresolved, argues Schroeder. That 
is to say, a plausible account of human dignity should be at hand before 
considering its precise normative function in the constitution of human rights. 
However, given this rather messy discourse on human dignity, Schroeder insists, 
human rights‘ theorizing should better abandon the purchase of human dignity and 
instead seek out alternative routes at grounding human rights. In addition, the 
attempt to ground human rights with a relatively more obscure notion of dignity 
constitutes ―hazard by association‖. Foundational concepts ought to be clear, 
unambiguous and must elicit less controversy; however, dignity admits a number 
of mutually exclusive, perhaps equally valid, contextual interpretations. It makes 
more sense to ask, ―which dignity?‖ than to ask, ―which human rights?‖. It is, thus, 
unclear which contextual interpretation to consider as a foundation for human 
rights. That is by far Schroeder‘s most compelling argument (in the sense that it 
illustrates her point with some measure of philosophical lucidity) against dogmatic 
adoption of the familiar view that human rights are founded on the inherent dignity 
of the human person. 
Compelling as that may be in locating uncritical deployment of the concept 
of human dignity, we must also be equally suspicious of the blanket rejection of 
any attempt at grounding human rights in human dignity. After all, being 
controversial is no argument for abandon and does not weigh heavily on a concept 
of such enormous significance. Evidently, 
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There are various [incompatible] understandings of other normative 
and descriptive concepts as well [for example], of justice, fairness, 
autonomy, respect for persons and so on. In none of these contexts 
would disagreement about the meaning of the relevant concepts be 
accepted as a reason for giving up the concept; they would more likely 
be seen as a good reason for continuing the discussions about the right 
understanding of the term in question. (Schaber, 2013, p. 158). 
Why should that be any different for the concept of human dignity? 
In what follows, I shall put forth the reasons why I think Schroeder‘s claim 
should be rejected. In the first place, the described list of meanings to dignity does 
not portray a clear distinction, nor does it exhaust all morally relevant meanings 
that human dignity might convey. 
In the first place, Schroeder‘s two distinctions in dignity are beset by an 
error of equating inherence with inviolability. A property or characteristics inherent 
to the human person doesn‘t necessarily command inviolable normative force. 
Inherence entails that a property is innate, built-in or is constitutive to its holder. 
Inviolability, on the other hand, implies a unique normative relation that moral 
agents ought to have in relation to the object of moral concern. A property is either 
inherent/intrinsic or extrinsic, but whether inherent properties are inviolable 
(resistant to trade-offs) is a matter of higher order normative consideration. That is 
why the notion of ‗inviolable property‘ would be absurd. Take the capacity for 
laughter, for example, an inherent property of the human person; any right 
pertaining to the free exercise of this wonderful human capacity is not by definition 
immune from violation or infringement under any circumstances. To use a more 
extreme example, it seems fair to say that our capacity for cruelty is as inherent as 
our capacity for kindness, mercy and reverence for life. And yet, it would be 
contradictory to confer inviolability towards these opposing but equally inherent 
elements of the human nature. Incidentally, there is a convenient tradition in moral 
reasoning to infer inviolability directly from inherent properties rather than from 
properties contingently held by persons regardless of how morally salient those 
qualities might be at the time of attribution. Nonetheless, claims of inviolability are 
not given by inherence. And on the flip side, most legal rights enshrined in national 
constitutions are framed to be inviolable but arguably not all of them are attached 
to inherent attributes of the human person; a similar thing can be said about a 
number of rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.   
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Now recall that Schroeder categorised ‗aristocratic dignity‘ under the class 
of aspirational dignity. However, most of the prominent conceptions of ‗aristocratic 
dignity‘ are best characterised as epitoms of inviolable dignity rather than of 
aspirational dignity. Aristocratic orders of rank, as a matter of historical fact, were 
established as if they were perfect embodiments of the natural order of things. The 
natural order was conceived to embody values that must be respected, not just 
descriptions of the way things are. Moreover, the dignity invested on the superior 
rank was defended as inviolable to the extent that the supposed hierarchical scheme 
of things reflects the fundamental normative moral order. Any society, pastime, 
present, or merely imaginary, that established caste systems of one type or another, 
characteristically defend its claim for differential moral status by resorting to a 
fitting (although mistaken) natural law theory. Consistent with the theoretical 
framework within which aristocracy operates, the dignity accorded to the highest 
social class is by definition inherent to their person. Consequently, the respect that 
the dignity of the aristocrat commands, by the same reasoning, was presumed to be 
inviolable. In contemporary societies, this obsolete aristocratic hierarchy manifests 
in relation to the differential moral concern we now accord to human beings in 
contrast to other animals.    
It may not be accurate to say that aristocratic dignity accords unequal status 
to persons when it discriminates some class of people from others; instead, it 
narrows down the category of persons capable of full moral agency only to a 
subclass of people that nature has presumably graced with superior attributes and 
are entitled to full personhood by that account. Apologists of aristocratic moral 
systems attach the legitimacy of ‗what is‘ (the status-quo) to the degree to which it 
reflects what ought to be. Thus, the origin of aristocratic moral status is both 
purportedly inherent to the human person (person defined in that narrow sense) and 
is also informed by a policy of equality of respect.   
Given what has been stated in the above, one can now easily discern an 
essential congruence between ‗aristocratic dignity‘ and the religious temperament 
upon which the traditional Catholic dignity is predicated. That is to say, aristocratic 
conception of dignity as rank is best classified under Schroeder‘s first category of 
dignity, which she termed as ‗inviolable dignity‘. Now that aristocratic dignity is 
reclassified under the first category, we now have a more consistent basis of 
distinction. It may be asked: what relevant difference does such change make with 
respect to the effort at refuting Schroeder‘s main thesis? Simply put, the 
introduction of this subtle change at the very least destabilises the presumably 
inherent tension between the two categories of dignity- namely inviolable and 
aspirational dignity.   
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Secondly, the two categories of dignity are not mutually exclusive, that we 
can propound an overarching theory that conceives them as compatible without 
losing sight of the specific foundational issue in question. We do not need to 
abandon recourse to aspirational dignity in order to advance the view that human 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. It may still be argued 
reflection on the foundation of human rights is the domain of the normative 
framework within which inviolable dignity is to be found. Whereas, comportment 
dignity that is the sort of dignity invested in virtue or character is not compatible 
with a normative system that underpins the distinctive moral commands human 
rights allegedly envelop. Linking dignity with virtue, merit, or in accordance with 
comportment abilities would effectively exclude a significant number of human 
beings, and for that reason, argues Schroeder, ―have no place in discussions about 
[the foundation of] human rights.‖ That is a valid point, but it has little bearing on 
the judgement whether inviolable dignity grounds human rights. 
Aspirational dignity may still be argued to play a vital, though not 
foundational, role in the constitution of rights. In exercising our rights, a capacity 
(and virtue) for moral self-restraint is a necessary ingredient that a person with 
dignity should possess. Dignity viewed as self-control balances compulsive, 
obsessive and unrestrained claiming of a bumptious person on the one hand, and at 
the same time encourages against a passive acceptance of violations of rights by a 
despondent person. She writes: ―While having and exercising certain rights is 
important to our dignity as human beings, what we commonly regard as essential to 
human dignity would not be explained even if we were to delineate all of the 
relevant rights and the particular ways in which each of them expresses or protects 
human dignity.‖ (Meyer, 1989, p. 521). For human rights to be of any significant 
moral function, setting aside, for now, what might justify them, they ought to be 
attached to ―our ability to make these rights serve our own ends‖, which in turn 
requires a minimal capacity for self-control. Michael J. Meyer advances this view 
when he writes: ―Though human rights do perform a moral function (the moral 
function of obliging others to respect us by way of respecting some of our most 
basic claims), what makes their function moral is the fact of the human capacity for 
authentic self-control‖ (Ibid, p. 534). Each of the two components of the moral 
function that human rights perform are underpinned by two distinct but 
complementary notions of human dignity: the morality of respect by inviolable 
dignity and the latter–the ethical responsibility of the holder of rights to make a 
morally compelling use of her rights in a manner that reflects one‘s authentic self-
control–by aspirational dignity.   
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It may be the case that inviolable dignity and aspirational dignity are 
different limbs of the same ethical/moral nexus that constitute a unified system of 
values; I see nothing troubling in that, much less a fundamental tension between 
the two. Furthermore, following Ronald Dworkin one may declare that the 
inviolable/aspirational dichotomy perfectly illustrates the analytic distinction that 
he champions–namely, between the ethical and the moral realms. Aspirational 
dignity reflects one‘s ethical responsibilities for living well while inherent dignity 
supplies the moral dimension for the overall unified system of values (Dworkin, 
2011). According to Dworkin, dignity is attached to two ethical principles: self-
respect, which requires taking seriously the objective importance of one‘s life; and 
authenticity which entails that the individual takes personal responsibility for 
cultivating a life that is consistent with one‘s own professed narrative of what 
counts as success in life. These two principles of dignity perform two 
complementary normative functions: on the one hand, they guide our ethical life by 
instructing us how to live well while in pursuit of a coherent and objectively 
valuable path in life, and on the other hand they ―elucidate the rights individuals 
have against their political community‖ within the framework of interpersonal 
moral duties that they owe to one another. Consequently, Dworkin advances a 
conception of human dignity that unifies the realm of self-referent ethical 
responsibility with categorical moral duties of respect and equal concern for others. 
He writes, 
 
Each person must take his own life seriously: he must accept that it is 
a matter of importance that his life be a successful performance rather 
than a wasted opportunity. I‘m talking about dignity. It‘s a term 
overused by politicians, but any moral theory worth its salt needs to 
proceed from it. (Dworkin, 2011, p. 203) 
 
Even though the ethical and moral are analytically distinct realms yet 
normatively reinforce one another, the same thing can plausibly be said about 
aspirational and inviolable dignity. That is to say, a plausible theory of human 
dignity ought to integrate the two perspectives into an overarching and all-
encompassing value theory–in the words of Dworkin, a theory of justice for 
hedgehogs. 
This is therefore to say that the perceived tension between the two categories 
of dignity is illusory as both meanings can plausibly be formulated in ways that 
beget no contradiction. It follows that Schroeder‘s argument–which states that 
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deploying human dignity at the foundations of human rights would bring ―hazard 
by association,‖ does not hold.   
 
The justification paradox? 
Schroeder maintains that an attempt to ground human rights in human dignity will 
unavoidably lead to a ‗justification paradox.‘ What she meant by the justification 
paradox reads as follows: should we adopt a secular conception of human dignity 
we ought at the same time have to abandon assigning human rights to all human 
beings in virtue of their humanity, whereas, according to Schroeder, ―[i]f we want 
to use dignity as a foundation for human rights and accord all human beings human 
rights, then only the Traditional Catholic understanding of dignity is appropriate‖. 
Without reference to religious authority, she argues, human dignity loses its 
egalitarian ethos and, thus, any substantive deployment of dignity shall backpedal 
from the formidable progress we have made in terms of conferring equal respect 
and concern to all human beings. Appeal to religious authority is peculiar to the 
‗dignity axiom‘, whose normative relevance to secular morality runs suspect. If 
one, however, wants to get rid of the problematic religious or metaphysical pillar 
of the concept, one must at the same time be ready to abandon the idea that all 
human beings possess dignity in virtue of their humanity. 
Schroeder‘s argument for a justification dilemma, however, rests on one 
fundamental but flawed premise, which asserts that an idea of human dignity have 
by all human beings must necessarily be coloured by the ―religious sentiment‖. 
Conversely, the most philosophically compelling secular view, namely, the 
Kantian conception, does not appear egalitarian. However, that thesis rests on a 
false dichotomy. To be clear, hardly any of the distinguished scholars of Kant 
subscribe to Schroeder‘s arguably shallow reading of Kant on human dignity (see 
Sensen, 2011). Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that Kantian dignity 
as inegalitarian, that do not mean we are left with just one other alternative- 
namely the traditional Catholic dignity or a similar conception with equivalent 
religious underpinnings. 
The recent discourse on human dignity is invariably marked by a diversity 
of competing views with respect to the nature and value of human dignity. For 
instance, Jeremy Waldron propounds a rank/status conception of human dignity 
that is also purportedly foundational to human rights had by all human beings; 
Ronald Dworkin defends an ethical theory which encapsulates a concept of dignity 
that underpins moral duties we owe to each other including fundamental 
entitlements that we call human rights; Stephen Darwall suggests that it is more 
plausible to conceive of human dignity as the moral authority that serves as the 
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underlying basis of interpersonal morality. These examples illustrate that human 
dignity did not sever its tie with the egalitarian ethos when religion lost its 
normative grip on moral thinking. Dignity‘s recent currency in moral and legal 
reasoning is merely indicative of the enormous potential that lies beneath the 
apparently messy surface. But to contend that the human rights discourse must quit 
taking seriously a dignitarian foundation of rights would amount to unduly 
restricting the limits of the possible with what‘s apparently given by the actual.  
Moreover, Schroeder‘s understanding of a normative foundation excludes 
the possibility of foundational pluralism. I take issue with her generic and 
wholesale approach to the question: what, if anything, justifies human rights? In 
answering such question, the supposition that human rights are universal–that they 
are possessed by all human beings, has little bearing on the issue whether those 
rights are underpinned by a single overarching norm or by plurality of normative 
principles. The idea of a singular overarching foundation of human rights is not 
given by their egalitarian distribution. One promising approach is to reflect on 
whether the talk of dignity as a basis of human rights is compelling in light of 
foundational pluralism. 
Some promising conceptions have it that, it is more plausible to think of 
human dignity as foundational to some rights and not to others (at least not 
directly). Whereas some of the fundamental human rights may be derived directly 
from human dignity, others are grounded on autonomy, or other moral values 
―without regard to the place those ideas have, in turn, in the analysis of dignity‖ 
(Waldron, 2013, p. 5). And consistent with our intuitive attachment of the concept 
with paradigmatic violations of human rights, dignity may be germane to some 
rights than others. Oftentimes, the notion of respect for human dignity manifests 
through our indignation towards torture or slavery or other incidents of humiliating 
and dehumanizing treatment of persons more emphatically than, for instance, the 
reactive attitudes we find fitting to violations of the right to work or a right to 
periodic holidays with pay. Some of the human rights-claims declared under in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, specifically those listed under economic, 
social and cultural rights, are not clearly inspired by human dignity and perhaps 
not derived from it. 
Moreover, the notion that human rights are universal does not necessarily 
presuppose that all human beings actually possess the exact same catalogue of 
rights regardless of their specific circumstances of being. On the contrary, 
biological determinants of either the developmental or the accidental sort (for 
instance, children or the mentally disabled) or factors that are merely contingent 
(example, a Robinson Crusoe living in virtual isolation), may determine the actual 
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roster of human rights that individuals may happen to possess or lack thereof ―due 
simply to the fact that it would make no sense to ascribe rights to beings who are in 
principle unable to exercise them‖ (Schaber, 2013, p. 158). 
However, no one loses one‘s dignity just because he or she is in principle 
incapable of being possessed of certain rights. Could that be evidence against the 
universality of human rights or a reason for discounting human dignity as their 
possible basis? Evidently, some rights pertaining to moral self-legislation 
including the right to autonomy can be withheld or severely restricted from a 
specified category of human beings such as children and adults suffering from 
advanced stages of dementia. If the mentally disabled are accorded moral 
protection consistent with their equality in rights and dignity–a full state of 
equality which one can say children are born to though they are not born with it, 
that indicates the implausibility of adopting a strict interpretation of the Kantian 
theory according to which human dignity is predicated solely on moral self-
legislation. This is simply to say that, the (normative) fact of some people lacking 
certain rights does not falsify the general proposition that ―all human beings 
possess certain rights in virtue of their humanity.‖ 
Not all theories of rights, and certainly not all Kantians, postulate the right-
holder‘s capacity for moral self-legislation as a singular grounding factor for 
assigning rights to her, although for Kantians moral agency rests on the rational 
capacity for self-legislation. I shall not revisit the debate whether moral self-
legislation is the sole adequacy condition for determining whether a norm or 
imperative is morally binding. It suffices to say the following. One can still be a 
subject, i.e. a holder, of human rights even though incidentally one‘s capacity for 
moral agency has been totally undermined, as it was, by a debilitating mental 
illness or psychosis. He may no longer be considered as a moral agent (in the sense 
that his intentions and actions are subject to moral evaluation) up until an adequate 
measure of his moral-psychological functioning is restored. Be that as it may, it 
would be too much of a stretch even for a Kantian to believe that moral self-
legislation is what confers a compelling moral force for basic moral rights such as 
the right to life.   
The supposition that some human beings may not have certain rights, 
whether problematic or not in and of itself, engenders a peculiar problem to the 
foundation of human rights. As rightly noted by Schaber: ―The question is whether 
the fact that human beings do not have certain rights in virtue of being members of 
the human species is a special problem for a dignity foundation of human rights, as 
opposed to any foundation of human rights‖ (Ibid.). 
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Similarly, the question ―why should being human be a reason for having 
certain rights?‖ is indispensable for understanding the fundamental fabric of ‗rights 
morality‘. Reference to our common humanity ought not be understood in the 
strictly biological sense; of course, although in many ways it implies that we are of 
the same natural kind. 
The common humanity relevant to the possession of human rights must be 
understood as a normative concept that no single or a cluster of descriptive 
properties of the biological person can adequately capture, without meaning to say 
that our intellectual and psychological make up, moral sensibilities, an underlying 
social psychology, capacity to pleasure, and our vulnerabilities to pain and 
suffering are irrelevant to it. Our common humanity and the most fundamental 
claims that protect it ought not be divorced from the human condition, but that 
don‘t mean a mere description of what constitutes the human condition could by 
itself generate a categorical moral force that human rights are imbued with. 
 
Toward a criterion for a plausible conception of human dignity (that 
does not generate a justification paradox) 
In total accord with Schaber, it is imperative to table some criteria on what may 
count as an adequate conception of dignity that can justify human rights. It is 
immediately evident that some conceptions of dignity are not suited to be directly 
foundational to human rights. Those conceptions belonging to, in Schroeder‘s 
taxonomy, the class of ‗aspirational dignity‘ might not satisfy a modest 
justificatory criterion. Nevertheless, specific conceptions of aspirational dignity do 
still have important role to play in terms of underscoring the value that deriving a 
proper moral function from rights has for a worthwhile life. Furthermore, virtue-
ethical conceptions of dignity inform us the categorical nature of our ethically 
responsibility we carry ourselves with dignified bearing, such that meaningful life 
is to be found in the voluntary act of carrying out the burdens and opportunities of 
life and in doing that with dignified bearing.  
The line separating the ethical and moral conceptions of human dignity also 
cuts across two distinctions of value introduced in the literature by Elisabeth 
Anderson, namely between appealing value and commanding value (Anderson 
2008). What we learn from Kant‘s deep insight into the structure of values, 
Anderson argues, is that we grasp dimensions of value through our feelings. 
Values come either as appeal or as command, and we respond to each in 
dramatically different ways. ―Appealing values constitute the domain of the good, 
commanding values the domain of the right‖ (Anderson 2008, p. 123).  The idea of 
human dignity as a commanding value may originate in the ethics of honour which 
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assumed, as it was, that persons with unmatched moral integrity are to be accorded 
the highest respect and moral difference. But, before the emergence of Kant‘s 
moral theory a strict distinction was not drawn between the respect commanding 
and the comportment expressing component of dignity as honour. We can now 
draw a distinction between dignity as comportment or honourable demeanour and 
dignity as a claim by which all rational beings exact or demand respect from one 
another (MM, 6:435). Failure to respect dignity as a commanding value implies 
violation of a categorical moral injunction, that is to mean dignity violations are to 
be considered not only as morally wrong but also constituting personal offense 
(Feinberg, 1987, & 1988). 
Respect for human rights also takes this deontic form on a par with a fitting 
attitude that Kant attaches to respect for the dignity of persons. Consequently, the 
underlying normative framework (within which human rights as well as human 
dignity are to be found) ought to confer victims of violations a moral mandate to 
demand, in the sense that individuals are morally sanctioned to address each other 
with– ―you owe me!‖ (Feinberg, 1970, & Darwall, 2006). In other words, the 
moral sanction predicated on being possessed of human dignity ought to constrain 
us in such a way that we are answerable to one another. The upshot is that, such 
adequacy condition shall render a deontic account of human dignity on a consistent 
footing with the logic of rights, which will, in turn, locate the adequate justificatory 
locus of the concept.  
To be clear, other normative frameworks may require us be morally 
accountable to one another, although not in the strictly personal sense. Take ‗duty-
based morality‘ for example. On this approach to morality, a person towards whom 
a duty is breached is not in a unique position to demand that it be rectified: a third 
party may be equally authorized to do so. Perhaps moral criticism is the most 
appropriate response to non-observance of duty. If I am disinclined to perform my 
duties regarding the fellow next door, if anything, I won‘t owe it to him any more 
than I would to an innocent bystander who is not affected whatsoever by my 
attitudes and actions. Respect for dignity can be viewed in this light. But viewed as 
such, dignity will ultimately fail to fit into the theoretical system within which the 
concept of rights operates. A proponent of ‗duty-based morality‘ may consistently 
respond to claims for respect for dignity that are directed at him with a conviction 
that rational persons are self-legislating and, hence, are solely answerable to the 
moral law which they would voluntarily subject themselves to. Such reply has an 
uncanny resemblance to, and thus be considered as a secular version of, the famous 
biblical interjection which reads: ―To Thee only have I sinned‖ where in our case 
reference to God is replaced by the moral law.   
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This is thus to say that an adequate understanding of dignity must reflect 
what Anderson calls a commanding value, which combines the requirement for 
respect with the value‘s ostensibly categorical moral grip. Secondly, it must also 
designate a moral authority by which one can demand respect from all other 
human beings. It is precisely this fundamental normative standing of persons (a 
principle that protects essential components of human subjectivity) that some 
philosophers characterise as human dignity. It encompasses ―the respect we must 
show people just out of recognition of their status as people‖ (Dworkin, 2011, p. 
205). Similarly Schaber contends that, ―an adequate understanding of dignity has 
not just to account for the core human rights; it has also … be able to explain why, 
for instance, the humiliation of people is a violation of dignity, or why 
discrimination against people violates dignity‖ (Schaber 2013, p. 159). 
The idea that as a fundamental normative standing of persons human dignity 
protects human subjectivity elicits little controversy. It goes without saying that 
some human rights-claims are more germane to the protection of human 
subjectivity than others, and for that reason can be directly underpinned by the 
principle of human dignity. It remains an open question whether dignity underpins 
only some of the core human rights while other normative concepts accounting for 
the reminder of human rights-claims. The core human rights- namely the human 
right to liberty and security of the person, the right not to be enslaved, prohibitions 
against torture and inhuman treatment, safeguards against humiliating and 
degrading treatment- clearly protect the moral status of human beings. The claim 
that most fundamental human rights protect the moral status of individuals does 
not in itself warrant that all human rights are derived from human dignity. In order 
to prove the latter, I must admit that more argument is required than simply 
demonstrating that human dignity is normatively prior to human rights.  
Nevertheless, an adequate conception of human dignity should be found 
within a normative framework which permits a unique spectrum of what P. F. 
Strawson termed as (participant) reactive attitudes (Strawson, 1962). Indignation 
and humiliation are reactive attitudes specifically attached to the notion of respect 
for human dignity. Of course, the moral grip that reactive attitudes such as a 
feeling of humiliation might have for underscoring inter-personal moral relations 
needs to be clarified in precise and unambiguous terms. In moving towards that 
end, an adequate theory of human dignity must explain, as well as account for, 
why certain instances of (subjective feelings of) humiliation and indignation are 
(or would be considered) morally warranted and why some are not (Ibid, supranote 
2). On the one hand, not every instance in which someone claims to have been 
subjected to humiliation is ipso facto justified, and on the other hand, not every 
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violation of human rights is at the same time occasioned by a justified feeling of 
humiliation. Corollary to that, humiliation is often constituted by the manner in 
which some rights are violated, rather than by the simple fact of a right‘s violation. 
One may have a justified feeling that one‘s self-respect is injured when one is 
treated as if he/she counts for nothing, even though such act was occasioned by a 
very minor infringement of a right. This requirement should be viewed 
independently of the question whether human rights are grounded on human 
dignity.  
However, the revelation that respect for human dignity is more germane to 
moral prohibitions against humiliating and degrading treatment of persons has two 
significant ramifications for the question of justification. Firstly, it attests to the 
idea that human dignity is not extensionally identical with human rights, which, in 
turn, debunks the most trenchant criticism that human dignity is redundant. And 
secondly, if a stringent moral condemnation is warranted due to the humiliating 
gestures with which minor infringements of a right are committed, that reinforces 
the claim that respect for human dignity is normatively prior to respect for rights. 
The cumulative force of these two ramifications confers a prima facie reason for 
thinking that human rights are founded on the inviolable dignity of the human 
person. 
To reiterate, an adequate conception of human dignity should fulfil two 
conditions in order to be considered as a foundation for human rights: First, it must 
vindicate the most basic human rights in so far as basic rights are understood to be 
those rights that directly protect the core constituents of human subjectivity; 
secondly, such a theory has to be predicated on a normative framework within 
which reactive attitudes such as the feeling of humiliation and indignation could be 
uniquely tied to the idea of respect for human dignity.  
 
Human dignity as the moral standing for having rights 
Positive insights from our considered reflections about paradigmatic 
violations of human dignity and the structure of reactive attitudes that they 
warrant, confer a prima facie support to the view that human dignity is a 
specific moral status/standing of beings that are possessed of having rights. 
Such view can be cashed in terms of two contrasting conceptions of human 
dignity.  
It may be interpreted along the lines of Jeremy Waldron who contends 
that dignity is a normative status that not only underpins human rights but 
also serves as a content of some rights. This reading stipulates a dualistic 
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relationship between human dignity and human rights. On the one hand, 
―dignity is a normative status and that many human rights may be 
understood as incidents of that status‖ (Waldron 2012, p. 18). And on the 
other hand, some rights may be understood as more germane to the 
protection of this underlying normative status of persons. We are said to 
have the human right against ―outrages on personal dignity‖ including 
specific protections against torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading and 
humiliating treatment of persons. These rights have a direct bearing on our 
standing as beings with human dignity, whereas some welfare rights, for 
instance, may be conceived as a little far off that mark.  
Peter Schaber, on the other hand, defends the view that human dignity 
is the normative authority and itself a general moral right which grants 
individuals ―the authority to do what one wants with regard to whatever 
falls within the purview of one‘s authority‖ (Schaber 2013, p. 160). This 
normative authority, that Schaber equates with human dignity, comprises 
―anything that is important in my life– for example, who I live with, who I 
marry, what profession I choose, what projects I take up, etc‖ (Ibid.). This 
particular reading of the specific normative status we all have in virtue of 
our humanity, strikes accord with the juridical interpretation of human 
rights. Schaber‘s interpretation appears to endorse the familiar legal 
tradition of declaring human dignity as inviolable and went on cashing it in 
terms of a specific right that prohibits ―outrage against dignity‖.  
The difficult thing here is not to identify what falls within the 
boundaries of our normative authority but to identify what falls outside its 
purview, unless one wishes to include the entire archive of codified human 
rights law within the ambit of normative authority. Schaber opts for the 
latter path when he writes, ―it is not just liberty rights which protect the 
normative authority of human beings, but also social and cultural human 
rights such as the right to an adequate standard of living (Art. 25), the right 
to a basic education (Art. 26), and the right to freely participate in the 
cultural life of the community (Art. 27).‖ Apparently, anything (objectively) 
important in one‘s life can be fitted within the realm of normative authority, 
in which case any right violation would automatically constitute a violation 
of human dignity. This is both counterintuitive and may also lend itself to 
inflationary deployment of the concept of dignity.   
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Moreover, the supposition that normative authority is an overarching 
right engenders a ‗justification paradox‘ (though not of the kind that 
Schroeder argued any secular conception of human dignity would). Here is 
the conundrum: in declaring normative authority as just another (albeit an 
overarching) moral right, we may fall back to the very same foundational 
question we began our analysis with. If as normative authority dignity is a 
fundamental moral right, then it requires an underpinning of the sort we find 
compelling which would in turn underpin specific human rights-that reflect 
dignity. That would be a double bind, hence, back to square one.  
Contrariwise, Waldron‘s interpretation of dignity as moral status 
appears more promising. It can accommodate, also confer an adequate 
explanation for, the proposition that a moral offense can both be a 
paradigmatic violation of human dignity and at the same time a human right 
violation. Take torture for example. Cruel intentions and severe physical 
and psychological scars to be sustained weigh heavily on the reason why 
torture constitutes a violation of basic human right. Humiliating and 
degrading victims is intrinsic to the logic of torture, so is sadistically 
subjecting them to intolerable pain and suffering for the purpose of breaking 
their will and thereby reducing them to obedient automatons. But that is not 
all there is to say about the moral offense that torture manifests. What is 
also morally repugnant about torture is the underlying attitude of treating 
the victim merely instrumentally, as if the person counts for nothing. An 
argument can be produced why torture constitutes a violation of human 
dignity, whereas violation of a right to periodic holidays with pay might 
not. A stark distinction in moral stringency between these two offenses is 
made possible by adopting the view that dignity is the moral status of 
persons as being possessed of rights. 
 
Conclusion  
If the claims defended here are correct, which I believe they are, they can 
effectively disarm the general objection that human dignity is at best a redundant 
and at worst a useless concept. This paper systematically showed fundamental 
flaws in Schroeder‘s three knockdown arguments against taking seriously the 
familiar claim that human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person. That only takes us half way, for a complete defense of human dignity one 
must also propound a positive account of its nature, value, and moral grip. The 
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second half of this paper was designed to serve that end, in which significant space 
was devoted to the articulation and defense of human dignity as a moral standing 
of persons regarded as beings of the kind that are possessed of human rights. 
Taking morally appalling episodes in human history seriously, we may be 
able to discern that the moral stringency of a rights violation is inextricably tied to 
the context in which such violation occurs. For instance, disenfranchising 
minorities may warrant stringent moral sanction than a decontextualized 
imagination of it might suggest. Obviously, violations of the right to vote ought not 
to be understood as having a similar degree of moral offensiveness as slavery and 
torture, since the latter have the potency to strip people off their humanity. But a 
right to vote may be denied in ways that invoke the dignity claim in the same way 
as torture and slavery would. Often times, totalitarian regimes have summarily 
denied voting rights to all their citizens, but that does not necessarily reflect a 
manifest denial of the humanity of the people under their rule. However, denial of 
voting rights to some targeted groups such as religious and racial minorities 
produces a rather different moral problem, since in most cases such denial of rights 
is grounded on the conviction that the denied are of lesser humanity than the 
privileged. Jim Crow laws are of the kind that deny the equal moral standing of 
coloured people, whereas, in contrast, unduly stripping civil rights off ex-convicts 
on the basis of their (past) actions and character deserves a comparatively weaker 
moral condemnation. What drives the wedge in moral stringency between these 
two contextual violations of the same right is whether or not such violation of a 
right is also occasioned by the intent to humiliate, degrade, or otherwise to 
dehumanize persons on the basis of distinctive features that are irrelevant from the 
moral point of view. The line that colours such division is precisely the notion of 
respect for human dignity. 
There is another way of looking at the problem of normative foundation for 
human rights. Setting aside the adequacy conditions for determining the extent to 
which a specific right‘s close tie to human dignity enhances its contextual moral 
stringency, it is generally true that human rights ―have their home in normative 
systems with constructed personae.‖ (Wenar 2013, p. 229). Determining the nature 
of the ‗moral personae‘ that human rights are meant to protect is crucial for 
identifying what human rights there are, whereas failing to make such 
determination would mean that we might as well remain ambivalent about what 
human rights there are. The role of human dignity as a possible ground for human 
rights relates to meeting the conditions under which human rights ascriptions are 
valid, which includes defining the underlying ‗human moral personae‘. Human 
dignity reflects that we are beings of the sort whose moral standing has it that we 
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ought to be endowed with inviolable rights. An inquiry into the underlying 
normative structure within which human dignity is to be found is a task of 
immense significance which a modest paper like this cannot do justice. 
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